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Abstract—In this paper, we show how a dealer with limited
resources is possible to share the secrets to players via an
untrusted cloud server without compromising the privacy of
the secrets. This scheme permits a batch of two secret messages
to be shared to two players in such a way that the secrets
are reconstructable if and only if two of them collaborate.
An individual share reveals absolutely no information about
the secrets to the player. The secret messages are obfuscated
by encryption and thus give no information to the cloud
server. Furthermore, the scheme is compatible with the Paillier
cryptosystem and other cryptosystems of the same type. In light
of the recent developments in privacy-preserving watermarking
technology, we further model the proposed scheme as a variant
of reversible watermarking in the encrypted domain.
Keywords-secret sharing; cloud computing; homomorphic
encryption; reversible watermarking; multimedia security
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a study in cryptography invented inde-
pendently by Blakley [1] and Shamir [2]. In general, there is
one dealer who splits a secret into shares for n players and
only when any group of t or more players work collectively
will the secret be reconstructed from their shares. Any t−1
shares reveals restrictively no information about the secret.
This refers to as a (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
Conventionally, n shares are of at least the same size of the
secret itself. This n-fold increase in required storage is, how-
ever, space inefficient and thus has led to the notion of multi-
secret sharing [3]–[5]. Over the past decade, businesses and
individuals have entrusted an increasing amount of data to
the cloud for the purposes of processing and storage. In the
meanwhile, the advances in cloud computing have also led
to growing concerns for data privacy. A standard solution
to the concerns over privacy would be to encrypt the data.
However, the desired functionality may not be achievable
on the encrypted data. To address this problem, Rivest et
al. [6] introduced the notion of homomorphic encryption,
which permits mathematical operations to be performed on
the encrypted data. In reality, encryption algorithms are in-
built features in many widely available devices, while secret
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sharing algorithms have rather limited availability to the
public. In addition to this, many secret sharing algorithms are
patented and thus there are restrictions on the commercial
use of these intellectual properties. For these reasons, it is
of great interest to study secure secret sharing in the cloud,
or from a scientific point of view, secret sharing in the
encrypted domain.
In this paper, we propose a multi-secret sharing scheme
that permits a cloud server to split a batch of two encrypted
messages into two shares. The proposed scheme is secure
in two ways. First, the encrypted data gives no information
about the secrets to the cloud server. Second, an individual
share gives no information about the secrets to the player.
In light of the recent developments in privacy-preserving
watermarking technology, we further model the proposed
secret sharing scheme as a reversible watermarking scheme
that embeds the watermark payload into an encrypted media
producing two marked and encrypted medias. Only by pool-
ing two marked medias together will the watermark payload
be detected and the host media be recovered. The remainder
of this paper is organised as follows. Section II presents
the proposed secret sharing scheme. Section III models the
proposed scheme as a reversible watermarking scheme for
an authentication application. Section IV concludes our work
and outlines the directions for future research.
II. SECRET SHARING
Let Alice and Bob denote two players, Clare denote a
cloud server, and Dave denote a dealer. Suppose that Dave
wishes to share a batch of two secrets x and y to Alice
and Bob through Clare. To begin with, Dave encrypts x
and y into E(x) and E(y) and uploads them collectively
to Clare. Then, Clare creates two shares E(α) and E(β)
for Alice and Bob, respectively. Finally, Alice and Bob
download their respective shares and work collaboratively
in order to disclose the secrets. We assume that Dave has
the public key for encryption and both Alice and Bob
have the private key for decryption. We further assume that
Clare is an honest-but-curious party that is interesting in
learning the secret information, but does not deviate from
the protocol specification. An overview of the protocol is
shown schematically in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. A protocol of secure secret sharing in the cloud.
The scheme is demonstrated with the Paillier cryptosys-
tem [7], and yet is by no means limited to this particular
homomorphic cryptosystem. Before we proceed further, let
us first describe the homomorphic properties of the Paillier
cryptosystem. Let m1 and m2 be two arbitrary messages,
E(·) be the encryption function, and D(·) be the decryption
function. The message space and ciphertext space of the
Paillier cryptosystem are defined as the additive group
M = Z/nZ and the multiplicative group C = Z/n2Z∗,
respectively, where n is the product of two large primes
p and q. The Paillier cryptosystem permits homomorphic
addition:
D(E(m1) · E(m2) mod n2) ≡ m1 +m2 mod n, (1)
and homomorphic multiplication:
D(E(m1)m2 mod n2) ≡ m1 ·m2 mod n. (2)
Through the use of homomorphic operations, two shares are
created by
E(α) ≡ E(x)a · E(y)b ≡ E(ax+ by) mod n2,
E(β) ≡ E(x)b · E(y)a ≡ E(bx+ ay) mod n2, (3)
where a and b are any integers that satisfy
gcd(a+ b, n) = 1,
gcd(a− b, n) = 1. (4)
It would not be difficult to find proper a and b since n is the
product of two primes. Given that a2− b2 ≡ (a+ b) · (a− b)
mod n, we derive
gcd(a2 − b2, n) = 1. (5)
This also implies
gcd(b2 − a2, n) = 1. (6)
The proof for Eq. (6) will be given later. Clare distributes
(E(α), a) to Alice and (E(β), b) to Bob. After decryption,
Alice and Bob obtain
α ≡ D(E(α)) ≡ ax+ by mod n,
β ≡ D(E(β)) ≡ bx+ ay mod n. (7)
By pooling (α, a) and (β, b) together, they compute
aα− bβ ≡ (a2x+ aby)− (b2x+ aby)
≡ (a2 − b2)x mod n. (8)
We know that ∃!(a2 − b2)−1 such that
(a2 − b2) · (a2 − b2)−1 ≡ 1 mod n, (9)
since gcd(a2 − b2, n) = 1. This modular multiplicative in-
verse can be calculated by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Thus, the secret x is unveiled by
x ≡ (aα− bβ) · (a2 − b2)−1 mod n. (10)
In the same way, the secret y is uncovered by
y = (bα− aβ) · (b2 − a2)−1 mod n. (11)
Now, we give the proof for Eq. (6). More precisely, we
wants to prove the statement that gcd(−c, n) = 1 when
gcd(c, n) = 1, where c is an arbitrary integer. To prove the
statement by contradiction, we assume that
gcd(−c, n) = t 6= 1, (12)
when gcd(c, n) = 1. Since −c ≡ n−c mod n, Eq. (12) can
be rewritten as gcd(n− c, n) = t. This assumption implies
that there exists integers r1 and r2 such that
n− c = t · r1,
n = t · r2.
(13)
Thus,
t · r2 − c = t · r1, (14)
and then
c = t · (r2 − r1). (15)
From Eq. (15), we can infer that gcd(c, n) = t 6= 1,
which contradicts our initial assumption that gcd(c, n) = 1.
Therefore, the given statement has been demonstrated.
III. REVERSIBLE WATERMARKING
Considering the recent advances in privacy-preserving
watermarking technology, we introduce an extension of the
proposed scheme for reversible watermarking in the en-
crypted domain. The reader is referred to [8]–[10] for more
interesting combination of secret sharing and information
hiding. Digital watermarking is the practice of imperceptibly
embedding a watermark into a host media (e.g. audio, image
and video) and a watermark is usually a piece of information
associated with host media (e.g. digital identity and digital
signature) [11]. In general, there are three parties involved in
a watermarking protocol: a party who encodes the watermark
with the host media, a party who decodes the watermark
from the marked media, and an adversary who has malicious
intent against the protocol. The malicious adversary is often
modelled as a noisy channel between the encoder and
the decoder and the watermark can be either fragile or
robust against the channel noise depending on the appli-
cations. Conventionally, robust watermarking is in favour of
copyright protection [12], whereas fragile watermarking is
advantageous to integrity verification [13]. In some medical
and military applications, even the imperceptibly distortion
introduced by watermarking might be undesirable. This has
given rise to the notion of reversible watermarking in which
an additional requirement on reversing the watermarking
process is imposed [14]–[18]. In other words, the objective
is not only to detect the watermark, but also to recover the
host media. Recently, there are a surge of research interest in
reversible watermarking in the encrypted domain due to the
privacy concerns in cloud computing. This modern research
topic concerning the host media that has been obscured by
encryption and permitting the function of watermarking to
be outsourced to an untrusted cloud server without giving
away the information privacy [19]–[24].
Let Dave be a sender who wishes to embed a watermark
payload into a host media and shares the marked media to
two recipients Alice and Bob. Only by pooling two marked
media together will the watermark payload be detected and
the host media be recovered. Nevertheless, due to limited
resources, Dave has to entrust the function of watermarking
to an untrusted cloud server Clare. Let us assume that the
encryption key is publicly known, while the decryption key
is only known to Alice and Bob. For concreteness, we let
the host media be a digital image and yet the host media is
by no means limited to the digital content of this type. Let
I denote an 8-bit digital image such that
I := (bit1||bit2|| . . . ||bit8), (16)
where ‘||’ is the concatenation operator and
bit1 := (bit1,1||bit1,2|| . . . ),
bit2 := (bit2,1||bit2,2|| . . . ),
· · ·
bit8 := (bit8,1||bit8,2|| . . . )
(17)
are eight sequences of bits corresponding to eight bit-planes.
Let a pair of two large primes p and q be the private key
and n = pq be the public key. To make the given image be
compatible with the Paillier cryptosystem, we convert the
bits into decimal integers in Z/nZ sequentially in such a
way that a collection of log2 n bits in a certain bit-plane
is converted to an integer. In practice, we would convert a
collection of blog2 nc bits into an integer instead since the
value of log2 n is not necessarily an integer. We refer to this
discrete random variable as a symbol and denote it by x.
Hence, an encrypted image can be written as
E(I) := (E(x1)||E(x2)|| . . . ||E(x8)), (18)
where
E(x1) := (E(x1,1)||E(x1,2)|| . . . ),
E(x2) := (E(x2,1)||E(x2,2)|| . . . ),
· · ·
E(x8) := (E(x8,1)||E(x8,2)|| . . . )
(19)
are eight sequences of encrypted symbols corresponding to
eight bit-planes. The watermarking process is performed
sequentially on some selected encrypted symbols until all
the payload is embedded. The other unselected encrypted
symbols remain intact during the process. Due to the fidelity
constraint, we select the symbols that are composed of bits
from the insignificant bit-planes for watermarking.
For conciseness, we describe only how a single host
symbol is processed. Let x be a host symbol and y be a
watermark symbol. To start with, Dave encrypts x and y
into E(x) and E(y) and uploads them collectively to Clare.
By means of the proposed method, two shares E(α) and
E(β) are created. Alice and Bob download their respective
shares and decrypt them into α and β. This procedure
will be carried out iteratively until all the symbols are
downloaded and decrypted. Then, Alice and Bob form their
respective meaningful marked images by converting the
symbols back into bits, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The host
symbols and watermark symbols are reconstructable when
two marked images are pooled together. The joint procedure
of watermark detection and host recovery is identical to the
procedure of secret reconstruction.
(a) Alice’s marked image (b) Bob’s marked image
Figure 2. Two recipients’ marked images.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a (2, 2)-threshold multi-secret
sharing scheme in the encrypted domain. The scheme is
compatible with the Paillier cryptosystem and other homo-
morphic cryptosystems of the same type. In addition to this,
an application to reversible watermarking in the encrypted
domain is discussed. We wish that this work can be of
inspiration to the multimedia security and its associated
communities. From our perspective, a study towards a more
general (t, n)-threshold multi-secret sharing scheme in the
encrypted domain is of great research interest. Furthermore,
an extension to verifiable secret sharing [25], in which the
dealer and players are not always assumed to be honest,
deserves further consideration.
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